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VOYAGER PHASE B FINAL REPORT 
The r e s u l t s  of t h e  Phase B Voyager F l i g h t  Capsule s tudy are organized i n t o  
s e v e r a l  volumes. These are: 
Volume I Summary 
Volume I1 Capsule Bus System 
Volume 111 Surface Laboratory System 
Volume I V  Entry Science Package 
Volume V System I n t e r f a c e s  
Volume V I  
This  volume, Volume 111, desc r ibes  t h e  McDonnell Douglas p r e f e r r e d  des ign  f o r  
Imp lementa t ion  
t h e  Surface  Laboratory System. 
8 s e p a r a t e  documents, as noted below. 
It is arranged i n  5 p a r t s ,  A through E,  and bound i n  
P a r t  A Prefer red  Design Concept 1 document 
P a r t  B A l t e rna t ives ,  Analyses, Se l ec t ion  3 documents, P a r t s  B 1’ 
B and B3 2 
1 P a r t  C Subsystem Funct ional  Desc r ip t ions  2 documents, P a r t s  C 
2 and C 
P a r t  D Operat ional  Support Equipment 1 document 
P a r t  E R e l i a b i l i t y  1 document 
I n  o rde r  t o  assist t h e  reader i n  f ind ing  s p e c i f i c  material r e l a t i n g  t o  t h e  
Surface  Laboratory System, Figure 1 c r o s s  indexes broadly s e l e c t e d  sub jec t  matter, 
a t  the system and subsystem l e v e l ,  through a l l  volumes. 
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A summary of Engineering Reliability studies and results are contained herein. 
Significant attention was given to: 1) satisfying the constraints, 2)  failure mode, 
effect and criticality analyses, 3) quantitative reliability estimates, 4 )  relia- 
bility program requirements and 5) component part reliability. 
Reliability has been a key discipline in the VOYAGER system design for the de- 
velopment, integration, and selection processes of our preferred concept. "First 
time success'' and capability for degraded mode operation were the key objectives 
that guided the reliability analyses. 
to determine its contribution toward achieving these objectives. This was accomp- 
lished by utilizing four analytical and modeling techniques: 
a.  Failure Xode, Effect, and Criticality Analyses 
b. Reliability-Weight-Effectiveness Analyses 
c. Mission Effectiveness Model 
d. Conceptual tradeoff studies 
The most significant of these used by engineering reliability was the single- 
With this 
Each design concept was examined in detail 
point failure modes, failure effects, and failure criticality analyses. 
technique, critical or potential single-point failure modes were identified early 
for the various engineering concepts. 
fic redundancies, so that no potential single failure mode could have a catastro- 
phic effect on the mission, and to assure at least a degraded mode of operation. 
These analyses indicated the need for speci- 
The selection of the specific type of redundancy (functional, multi-channel, 
or block) was guided by the failure criticality of the mission event or equipment 
function. Incorporation of specific redundancies was influenced by the availability 
of a prime resource -- weight. The reliability-weight-effectiveness analyses re- 
sulted in the incorporation of redundmcy in the most effective manner to meet the 
specific mission objectives. 
of seventy-one redundancies thereby resulting in an estimated probability of success 
of our preferred Surface Laboratory concept of 0.776. 
Results of these analyses led to the incorporation 
Recognition of equipment sensitivity to long-life storage (in transit) envir- 
Alternate engineering de- onment was also taken into consideration in our design. 
sign concepts were evaluated to determine their compatibility with decontamination, 
sterilization, and Martian environments. 
The study revealed that the following reliability program elements must receive 
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increased major attention throughout the program: 
a .  Detail fai lure mode, e f f e c t ,  and c r i t i c a l i t y  analyses 
b .  Specially planned parts and materials program 
c .  Positive failure evaluation and corrective action 
d . Comprehensive design reviews 
2 
REPORT F694 0 VOLUME 111 0 PART E 0 31 AUGUST 1967 
MCDONNELL ASTRONAUTICS 
SECTION 1 
VOYAGER RELIABILITY CONSTRAINTS 
The VOYAGER r e l i a b i l i t y  program c o n s t r a i n t s  were i d e n t i f i e d  by a s tudy of t h e  
mission o b j e c t i v e s ,  environmental  requirements and p r e d i c t i o n s ,  mission p r o f i l e  
a n a l y s i s ,  t o t a l  program c o n s t r a i n t s ,  and conceptual  design s t u d i e s .  
t h i s  s tudy  emphasized t h e  fol lowing four  c o n s t r a i n t s  which r ece ived  major r e l i a b i l i t y  
a t t e n t i o n .  
The r e s u l t s  of 
a. 
b. Long-life s t o r a g e  
c. Unique environmental  f a c t o r s  
d .  Degraded mode c a p a b i l i t y  
1.1 NO CATASTROPHIC SINGLE FAILURE MODE - The VOYAGER Capsule Systems C o n s t r a i n t s  
and Requirements Document sppr l f i c s  a design requireaent that no poteiitlal single- 
f a i l u r e  mode s h a l l  cause a c a t a s t r o p h i c  e f f e c t  on t h e  mission. Compliance w i t h  t h i s  
requirement n e c e s s i t a t e d  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  e v a l u a t i o n ,  and r e s o l u t i o n  of a l l  poten- 
t i a l  c a t a s t r o p h i c  f a i l u r e  modes. 
f a i l u r e  mode, e f f e c t ,  and c r i t i ca l i ty  ana lyses .  
1.2 LONG-LIFE STORAGE - Conservative des igns ,  i nc lud ing  p o s s i b l e  material degrad- 
a t i o n ,  i n f luenced  o u r  concept s e l e c t i o n s .  S p e c i f i c  d e t a i l s  are d i scussed  w i t h i n  
t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  of each subsystem. 
1.3 UNIQUE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS - The e f f e c t s  of decontamination, s t e r i l i z a t i o n ,  
m d  t he  Martian atmosphere and surface p r o p e r t i e s  are unique t o  t h e  VOYAGER program 
and were considered i n  t h e  concept designs t o  minimize t h e  r e s u l t a n t  e f f e c t  on system 
r e l i a b i l i t y .  
No c a t a s t r o p h i c  s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  mode 
This w a s  accomplished by using r e s u l t s  of o u r  
The system design inco rpora t ed  t h e  e s t ima ted  extremes of t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
(Reference Volume 111, P a r t  A, Appendix A ) ;  t h e r e f o r e ,  f o r  cond i t ions  less severe 
than  t h e s e  extremes, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  r e l i a b l e  ope ra t ion  is  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  inc reased .  
1 .4  
w a s  t o  provide f o r  degraded mode ope ra t iona l  c a p a b i l i t y  i f  primary o p e r a t i o n a l  f a i l u r e s  
occurred.  
some measure of success  f o r  unexpected circumstances. For example, p a r t i a l  eng inee r ing  
and s c i e n c e  d a t a  t ransmission o r  retrieval is  provided even i f  t h e  high-rate  SL t r a n s -  
mi t te r  o p e r a t e s  i n  a degraded mode. 
t r a n s m i t t e r ,  t h e  low rate t r a n s m i t t e r  ( s o l i d  s t a t e )  provides  reduced engineer ing and 
s c i e n c e  d a t a  t ransmission.  
d e s c r i p t i o n s  of each subsystem. 
DEGRADED MODE CAPABILITY - A design requirement of system and subsystem concepts 
This  c a p a b i l i t y  has  been provided throughout t h e  des ign  t o  a s s u r e  at  least 
I n  t h e  event  of t o t a l  f a i l u r e  of t h e  high rate 
S p e c i f i c  design d e t a i l s  are d i scussed  w i t h i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  
1-1 
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SECTION 2 
FAILURE MODE EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS (FMECA) 
Continual engineering reliability analyses were used in identifying and eval- 
uating the failure modes and failure effects of the candidate concepts. 
of the failure mode criticality led to redundancy considerations. 
identified the potential single point failure modes. 





The analyses also provided 
FMECA METHOD - The method of performing the FMECA was to first identify the 
a. 
b. 
c. verformance of Larded Science cxperim_n_nts 
d. 
Achievement of Flight Capsule landing 
Performance of Entry Science experiments 
- 
Measurement of transmission of engineering data 
After identification of the mission objectives, the candidate concepts were eval- 
ua t ed by 
a. 
b. Identifying their failure modes 
c. 
Identifying the major component or function 
Classifying the effects of the failure modes 
The depth of the analysis was confined to the detail of the design. In most cases 
design detail was available down to the component or function level. Figure 2.1-1 
is a FMECA performed on the Surface Laborat~ry Telecem.mications subsystem and is 
representative of the methodology used for all the subsystems. 
system FMECA'S are presented within the subsystem functional descriptions, reference 
Part C of Volume 111. 
effects as: 
Other major sub- 




No effect on the mission objective. 
Degrading effect on mission objective. 
Possible catastrophic effect on mission objective. 
Classifications 3-2, 2-1, 3-1, etc., indicate the limits over which the failure 
effect may vary depending on the degree of failure or the time of occurrance in 
the mission. 
2.2 
had significant effects on the achievement of the mission objectives. These modes 
are tabulated in the failure mode, effects, and criticality summary, Figure 2.2-1, 
together with the recommended solutions. 
FMECA RESULTS - Several failure modes, identified by the subsystem FMECA's, 
2-1 
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Figure 2.0 - 1 (Continued) 
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DESIGN 
SURFACE LABORATORY  FUNCTION/EVENT 
Func t i  on 
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Radio L ink 
Heating of SL Equipment 
and Experiments 
Storage of Engineering and 
Science Data for Delayed 
Time Telemetering 
Panoramic Imaging of Martian 
Surface 
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Ex per i ment s 
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Biological and Soil Data 
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Func t i on a1 
Functional 
Figr;re 2.0-1 (Continued) 
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DESIGN CONCEPT REDUNDANCY CONSIDERATIONS Kont.) 
SURFACE LABORATORY 
EVENT 
Turn on Surface Laboratory 
Command Receiver, Tele- 
metry, Science Data Sub- 
system 
Activate Surface Laboratory 
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Collection and Processing 
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Figure 2.0-1 (Continued) 
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DESIGN CONCEPT REDUNDANCY CONSIDERATIONS (Cont. 
SURFACE LABORATORY 
EVENT 
Start Low Resolution Visual 
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Experi ments 
End Low Resolution Visual 
Imaging 
Turn On High Rate S-Band 
Transmitter 
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Figure 2.1-1 (Continued) 
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Figure 2.1-1 (Continued) 
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Figure 2.1-1 (Continued) 
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Figure 2.1-1 (Continued) 
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Figure 2.1-1 (Continued) 
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Figure 2.1- 1 (Continued) 
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2.3 
s i n g l e  f a i l u r e  mode s h a l l  cause a ca t a s t roph ic  e f f e c t  on t h e  mission and a l s o  t o  
a s s u r e  a high level of success i n  achieving t h e  mission ob jec t ives .  
requirement f o r  t h e  F l i g h t  Capsule design w a s  t o  f i n d  an optimum breakdown, arrange- 
ment, o r  i n t e r l a c i n g  of subsystems. 
Of subsystems Provide backup t o  o t h e r  subsystems t o  achieve f u n c t i o n a l  redundancy. 
Such b e n e f i t ,  al though i n  degraded mode, is accomplished without t h e  expense of added 
weight. 
a b l e  t o  accomplish t h e  func t ion  i n  an alternate manner. 
redundancy i s  our  p r e f e r r e d  approach, wherever p r a c t i c a l .  
were considered and cri teria f o r  e f f e c t i v e  a l l o c a t i o n  of t h e s e  redundancies w a s  developed. 
2.3.1 
t h e  system design. The 
dec i s ion  t o  use one o r  axlotiler required careful corisideraiiori oi the particular 
a p p l i c a t i o n  and i t s  p o s s i b l e  consequences. 
REDUNDANCY - Redundancy w a s  necessary t o  m e e t  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  t h a t  no  p o t e n t i a l  
An i n i t i a l  prime 
By such m e a n s ,  i t  w a s  des i r ed  t o  have a number 
This approach i s  not  based on equipment dup l i ca t ion  but r a t h e r  upon being 
As a r e s u l t ,  f u n c t i o n a l  
Three types of redundancies 
Types of Redundancies - Three redundancy schemes w e r e  s tud ied  and u t i l i z e d  i n  
Each type of redundancy has i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  advantages. 
a. Alternate Path o r  Functional Redundancy Method - This redundancy i s  
cha rac t e r i zed  by providing two o r  more phys ica l ly  d i f f e r e n t  b u t  f u n c t i o n a l l y  
i d e n t i c a l  methods t o  accomplish a funct ion.  The prime o b j e c t i v e  i n  employ- 
i n g  t h i s  method i s  t o  provide at least two s e p a r a t e  and independent paths  
by which c r i t i ca l  operat ions may be  performed. 
choice because i t  o f f e r s  g r e a t e r  p r o t e c t i o n  aga ins t  gene r i c  f a i l u r e  modes 
and unknown environmental s t r e s s e s .  It can be designed i n t o  t h e  system 
a t  r e l a t i v e l y  low penal ty  i n  terms of weight, volume, power, and system 
complexity. 
This  type i s  t h e  p r e f e r r e d  
b. Cooperative Multi-channel Methods - This redundancy i s  cha rac t e r i zed  by 
d iv id ing  t h e  equipment f o r  performing t h e  func t ion  i n t o  two o r  more indepen- 
dent po r t ions  i n  such a manner that  some por t ion  can f a i l  and t h e  func t ion  
can s t i l l  be performed with m i n i m u m  o r  no degradation. 
next  choice because no f a i l u r e  d e t e c t i o n  o r  switching f e a t u r e s  are required 
with t h i s  method. 
pena l ty  i n  weight, volume, and power. 
Ordinary Block o r  Element Redundancy Method - This  redundancy i s  character-  
i z e d  by the  p a r a l l e l i n g  of two i d e n t i c a l  u n i t s  i n  which f a i l u r e  of t h e  
ope ra t ing  u n i t  i s  sensed and i d e n t i c a l  equipment i s  switched i n  t o  accom- 
p l i s h  t h e  funct ion.  
are s u s c e p t i b l e  t o  the  same f a i l u r e  modes i f  exposed t o  ove r s t r e s sed  
This type i s  t h e  
It is  normally designed i n t o  t h e  system a t  a moderate 
c. 
This type is t h e  least d e s i r a b l e  because both u n i t s  
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conditions. It also requires the addition of a detection and switching 
unit therefore providing the least overall reliability improvement. In 
addition, parallel units with a detection and switching unit more than 
doubles the weight and increases power requirements. 
2 . 3 . 2  
for the incorporation of redundancies. However, the addition of redundancies rep- 
resents a corresponding weight increase. Thus, an initial criterion for decision 
on redundancy incorporation needed to be established. This criterion was a require- 
ment for achieving maximum increase in reliability with a minimum weight increase. 
An illustration of the implementation of this criterion is shown in Figure 2.3.2-1. 
The failure rate (A) for each component, system or subsystem must be utilized 
in establishing the non-redundant reliability (R ) from the equation: 
Reliability Versus Weight - The FMECA led to many suggested possibilities 
0 
- Xt . R = e  
0 9 
Then the reliability improvement 
by : 
lnRo + Ri = e 
(lnRo = At) 
for each subsequent change (AlnR) was calculated 
AlnR; AlnR = lnRi - lnRo 
Preference was given the component with the lowest weight increase for an incremental 
change in reliability (AW/AlnR) followed by units of increasing AW/AlnR. Utili- 
zation of this criterion resulted in the redundancy considerations shown in 
Figure 2 .3 .2 -2  and indicated the potential reliability improvement as shown in 
Figure 2 .3 .2 -3 .  This technique of redundancy considerations as applied to the 
Surface Laboratory, placed equal emphasis on the achievement of each mission object- 
ive. The competing characteristics of the Performance and Design Requirements for 
the 1973 mission indicates that equal emphasis should not be placed on each mission 
objective. 
priority of these objectives. 
effectiveness analysis study for the redundancy considerations. 
Therefore, an additional analytical technique was needed based on the 
Fulfillment of this need was accomplished by an 
2.3.3 Effectiveness Analysis - The effectiveness analysis study is the adaptation 
of a technique which evaluated the redundancy in terms of the achievement of the 
mission objective. The equation developed was: 
E = V  R + V 2 R 2 + V  R 1 1  3 3  
2-25 
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where V1 = Value index for the achievement of landing 
V2 = Value index for the performance of Entry Science experiments 
V3 = Value index for the performance of Landed Science experiments 




= Reliability index for the performance of Entry Science experiments 
= Reliability index for the performance of Landed Science experiments 
2 
3 
Based on the competing characteristics criterion described in the "Specification 
for Performance and Design Requirements for the 1973 VOYAGER Mission", it was estab- 
lished that the value index should have the relationship V 
v An effectiveness model was developed and is described and shown in 
Part B Section 4.6 of Volume 111. 
+ V2 + V3 = 1 and 1 
v2 > V3. 
As an example of the results of this analysis, Figure 2.3.3-1 shows a tabu- 
1 
lation of the priority rating for redundancy considerations based on the assign- 
ment of value indices: V = .40, V = .35 and V3 = .25. Comparisons of redundancy 
considerations from a reliability versus weight analysis and an effectiveness 
analysis are tabulated in the same Figure. 
2.3.4 
ness analysis results were used as the criteria for selecting the preferred system 
concept redundancies. The primary criterion, engineering judgment, required back-up 
capability for the performance of all critical mission events. This capability 
was provided regardless of the efficiency of weight increase to reliability improve- 
ment. After providing this capability, the selection of additional equipment re- 
dundancies was guided by the effectiveness analysis. The seventy-one (71) redund- 
ancies selected for the preferred concept are tabulated in Figure 2.3.4-1. Fifty- 
nine (59) are functional and consequently added minimal weight. 
2.3.5 
was modified as a result of the effectiveness analysis. Prior to this analysis, 
equal emphasis was placed on the redundancy considerations for Capsule Bus, Entry 
Package and Surface Laboratory. As the design concepts evolved, it became apparent 
this policy of equal emphasis must be modified to most effectively utilize a prime 
resource--weight. 
redundancy implementation policy. 
1 2 
Summary of Selected Redundancies - Engineering judgment and the effective- 
Redundancy Implementation Policy - The basic redundancy implementation policy 
Therefore the effectiveness analysis technique was used as the 
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QUANTITATIVE RELIABILITY ESTIMATES 
The primary purpose of the reliability estimates is to show relative com- 
parisons of reliability potentials of the many concepts considered, rather than 
to accurately predict the reliability of a given concept or the preferred concept. 
3.1 RELIABILITY ESTIMATE METHODS - The methods used in performing reliability 
estimates for the studies were maintained consistent with the level of design 
maturity. The primary elements necessary for establishing a quantitative re- 
liability estimate are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
3.1.1 
Specification was examined in detail and a representative mission for the Surface 
h b c r s t s r y  vas establ ishzd for reliabiiity escimates. 
amined to determine the possible effect of the events on subsystem reliability. 
This examination resulted in the establishment of failure rate modifiers to be 
applied in determining an equivalent mission duty cycle. 
applicable failure rate modifying factors are listed in Figure 3.1.1-1. 
factors are shown for both operating and non-operating equipment. The factors 
depict the significant relative environmental and application stresses for the 
different events. 
3.1.2 
of a reliability estimate is to determine the function and operations of the sub- 
system and its major components or assemblies. 
of the subsystem functional block diagram. 
diagram is illustrated by Figure 3.1.2-1. 
Mission Profile Analysis - The mission profile presented in the VOYAGER 
Mission events were ex- 
The mission events and 
Modifying 
Subsystem Configuration Definition - A necessary step in the computation 
This was accomplished by a study 
A typical subsystem functional block 
From this information a reliability logic diagram was prepared for the sub- 
system. 
assemblies which must function in order for the subsystem to successfully complete 
its mission. 
typical reliability block diagram is illustrated by Figure 3.1.2-2. 
3.1.3 
the next step in performing a reliability estimate was to determine a failure 
rate for each item or block in the reliability diagram. For the less complex sub- 
assemblies and/or components which appear in the diagram, the historical failure 
rate of a similar item was used. 
This is a "success path'' diagram showing those components and/or sub- 
The reliability diagram expands in detail as the design matures. A 
Failure Rate Determination - With a subsystem reliability diagram defined, 
The parts count technique, as illustrated by 
3- 1 
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Figure 3.1.3-1, w a s  used f o r  a l l  o t h e r  assemblies and/or  components. 
rates w e r e  used f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  component p a r t s  w i th  no at tempt  t o  p r e d i c t  p a r t  
d e r a t i n g  o r  environmental  stresses i n t e r n a l  t o  t h e  assembly. To i n s u r e  good relative 
comparisons of t h e  e s t ima ted  r e l i a b i l i t y  of competing concepts ,  a l i s t  of s t anda rd  
f a i l u r e  rates f o r  e lectr ical  and e l e c t r o n i c  p i e c e  p a r t s  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  and used f o r  
a l l  p a r t s  count estimates. This  same technique can be extended t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  e f f e c t s  
of p a r t  d e r a t i n g  and o p e r a t i n g  environments as t h e  d e t a i l e d  design of t h e  assemblies  
m a t e r i a l i z e s .  The p a r t  count technique p rov ides  an e f f e c t i v e  t o o l  f o r  determining 
areas i n  which r e l i a b i l i t y  can be improved by e f f e c t i v e  p a r t  d e r a t i n g  o r  by i n c o r r  
p o r a t i n g  redundancy w i t h i n  t h e  assembly. 
3.1.4 
concept q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e l i a b i l i t y  es t imate  w a s  t o  combine t h e  above elements.  
3.1.4-1 i l l u s t r a t e s  one technique f o r  a r r i v i n g  a t  t h e  subsystem estimate. 
t i m e  ( c  j w a s  deEermined f o r  each Subassembly by appiying the  modifying f a c t o r s  as 
p rev ious ly  shown i n  Figure 3.1.1-1 t o  the mission duty c y c l e  of t h e  subassembly. 
This t i m e  (t,), f o r  t i m e  dependent items, w a s  t hen  m u l t i p l i e d  by t h e  f a i l u r e  rate 
of t h e  i t e m  t o  f i n d  t h e  mission f a i l u r e  rate f o r  each i t e m .  The summation of t h e s e  
mission f a i l u r e  rates g ives  t h e  subsystem mission f a i l u r e  rate. The subsystem mission 
r e l i a b i l i t y  w a s  determined by u s e  of the formula 
Average f a i l u r e  




R o e  -%I 
3.2 RELIABILITY ESTIMATE LIMITATIONS - The l i m i t a t i o n s  of q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e l i a b i l i t y  
estimates must be recognized i f  r e s u l t s  are t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  properly.  
estimates f o r  system and subsystem r e l i a b i l i t y  made during t h i s  concept d e f i n i t i o n  
phase have accuracy l i m i t e d  by t h e  l e v e l  of des ign  ma tu r i ty .  Q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e l i a b i l i t y  
estimates are a v a l u a b l e  i n p u t  t o  early des ign  d e c i s i o n s  and w i l l  become more and more 
s i g n i f i c a n t  as t h e  design becomes more d e t a i l e d .  
from comparative e s t i m a t e s  t o a a r d  p r e d i c t i v e  estimates as t h e  design evo lves ,  w i t h  t h e  
f a i l u r e  mode, effect and c r i t i c a l i t y  analyses  being of primary importance i n  design 
shaping. 
3.3 SUMMARY OF RELIABILITY ESTIMATE RESULTS - The primary use  of t h e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
r e l i a b i l i t y  estimates has  been f o r  comparative e v a l u a t i o n  of competing subsystem 
concepts r a t h e r  t han  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  a c t u a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  of a given concept o r  t h e  
p r e f e r r e d  concept.  
major des ign  t r a d e  s t u d i e s  and w a s  a major f a c t o r  i n  many dec i s ions .  
have se rved  t o  h i g h l i g h t  areas f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  improvement. 
Q u a n t i t a t i v e  
The emphasis w i l l  g r adua l ly  s h i f t  
A q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e l i a b i l i t y  estimate w a s  a s t anda rd  inpu t  t o  
The estimates 
The r e l i a b i l i t y  
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estimates were a necessary input to the reliability versus weight and effective- 
ness analysis. 
A quantitative reliability estimate of the selected Surface Laboratory 
configuration has been computed and is presented in Figure 3.3-1. 
indicates that the telecommunication subsystem, electrical power subsystem and 
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SECTION 4 
RELIABILITY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS 
The Phase B study has revealed several reliability program elements LAch 
must receive increased major emphasis throughout the program. 
are: 1) Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis, 2) Specially planned 
parts and materials program, 3) Positive failure analysis, evaluation and correc- 
tive action, and 4) Comprehensive design reviews. 
4.1 
liability technique for highlighting potential design weakness. 
primary continuing reliability task performed concurrently with the detail design 
and operational contingency analysis. The FMECA carried to the detail level pro- 
v i d e s  t h e  basis f o r  design considerations which minimize mission failures or de- 
g~ adaiLwil. 
4.2 PARTS AND MATERIALS PROGRAM - The decontamination, sterilization, and long- 
life requirements demand the need for a specially planned parts and materials 
program. This program must provide for the selection, testing, and control of 
parts and materials to assure that the parts and materials meet these environ- 
mental and life requirements and do not compromise equipment reliability. 
4.3 
iently and positively identified, analyzed, and corrective action taken. This 
assures that no problem remains unidentified and immune to maximum corrective effort. 
4.4 
the Surface Laboratory System. 
emphasis on the review of the operational support equipment compatibility with the 
system and/or subsystems. The compatibility must be clearly evaluated by design 
review to assure that the interface design of the operational support equipment 
and flight equipment will not compromise the launch constraints. 
These elements 
FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS - E'MECA is a powerful re- 
It must be a 
FAILURE EVALUATION - "Failures" or performance irregularities must be exped- 
DESIGN REVIEWS - In depth design reviews must be conducted on all elements of 
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SECTION 5 
COMPONENT PART RELIABILITY 
B 
Recognizing t h a t  system r e l i a b i l i t y  i s  in f luenced  by t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  and 
a p p l i c a t i o n  of t h e  component p a r t s ,  we have devoted our Phase B e f f o r t  t o :  
de te rmining  t h e  e lements  of a rea l i s t ic  component p a r t  p l a n  , and (2)  i n i t i a t i n g  
certain elements of  t h i s  plan.  
(1) 
The elements of t h e  p l a n  are: 
a. An Approved P a r t s  L i s t  (APL) l i s t i n g  those  p a r t s  demonstrat ing a b i l i t y  
t o  m e e t  VOYAGER Capsule Bus requirements .  
b. S p e c i f i c a t i o n  c o n t r o l  f o r  a l l  p a r t s .  
c. P a r t s  Appl ica t ion  Manual f o r  e l ec t r i ca l  and mechanical p a r t s .  
d. P a r t s  Tes t  Program. 
e. i r a c e a b i i i t y  program. 
During Phase B w e  have begun work on e lements  a ,  b ,  c, and d as r epor t ed  
.. 
i n  t h e  paragraphs  immediately following. 
5.1 APPROVED PARTS AND MATERIALS LIST - During Phase B ,  a p re l imina ry  Approved  
P a r t s  L i s t  (APL) w a s  i s s u e d  and used by t h e  des ign  func t ions  as a guide where 
p a r t  i n fo rma t ion  w a s  r equ i r ed  t o  conduct meaningful  implementation s t u d i e s .  The 
d a t a  used t o  g e n e r a t e  t h e  l i s t  were taken from JPL Document ZPP-2010-SPL-C, 
"E lec t ron ic  P a r t s  S t e r i l i z a t i o n  Candidates f o r  Spacec ra f t  Applicat ion."  I n  
a d d i t i o n  an  Approved Materials and Processes  L i s t  w a s  p repared  based on d a t a  
a v a i l a b l e  t o  us from many sources  and from in-house t e s t i n g .  Only those  p a r t s ,  
materials and p rocesses  which exh ib i t ed  ev idence  of meet ing t h e  VOYAGER F l i q h t  
Capsule requi rements  were included i n  t h e s e  lists. These two l is ts  a re  Ycnonnell 
Douglas Reports  F189 and E936, r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
The APL i nc ludes  t a b u l a t i o n s  of s p e c i f i c  e l e c t r i c a l  and mechanical  parameters 
t o  a i d  t h e  des ign  groups i n  proper  p a r t  s e l e c t i o n s  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  
The APL subd iv ides  t h e  p a r t s  i n t o  three  c a t e g o r i e s .  
a. High R e l i a b i l i t y  - These p a r t s  are VOYAC'ER p r e f e r r e d  p a r t s  which have been 
s u b j e c t e d  t o  long term fai lure  rate l i f e  tests and have e s t a b l i s h e d  
low f a i l u r e  rates. 
b. P r e f e r r e d  P a r t s  - These p a r t s  are t e s t e d  and q u a l i f i e d  f o r  use i n  t h e  
VOYAGER F l i g h t  Capsule environment. 
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c. Nonstandard - These p a r t s  are S p e c i a l  o r  Limited a p p l i c a t i o n ,  and receive 
s p e c i f i c  t e s t i n g  and j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  use. 
It i s  recognized t h a t  modi f ica t ion  t o  t h e  Approved P a r t s ,  Materials and 
Processes  L i s t s  w i l l  b e  r equ i r ed  as the  VOYAGER Program progresses .  
component p a r t  r e l i a b i l i t y  program plan f o r  t h e  Phase C and D e f f o r t  i s  d e t a i l e d  
i n  P a r t  C ,  Sec t ion  10 of Volume V I .  
5.2 SPECIFICATION - Severa l  s p e c i a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  w e r e  produced f o r  t h e  
VOYAGER F l i g h t  Capsule Program during t h e  Phase B s tudy  i n  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
Phase C design e f f o r t .  
t h e  approved Sources of supply.  
ec ted  from JPL Document ZZP-2010-SPL-C. 
The cont inuing  
These s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  d e l i n e a t e  t h e  p a r t  requirements  and 
Approved sources  of supply cand ida te s  were sel- 
To min ia i ze  d u p l i c a t i o n ,  a two l e v e l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  system is used as 
descr ibed  below: 
a. General  S p e c i f i c a t i o n  - A s p e c i f i c a t i o n  covering t h e  g e n e r a l  requi re -  
ments fsr gezeric types  ~r families ~f p a r t s .  
b. Detai l  P a r t  Drawings - A s p e c i f i c a t i o n  d e l i n e a t i n g  t h e  d e t a i l  requirements  
f o r  a s p e c i f i c  p a r t .  
Examples of e x i s t i n g  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  are as fol lows : 
a. General S p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  VOYAGER F l i g h t  Capsule,  Semiconductors, Trnnsis-  
t o r s ,  Diodes and I n t e g r a t e d  C i r c u i t s  (207-780003) 
b. Deta i l  P a r t  Drawing, I n t e g r a t e d  C i r c u i t ,  Fl ip-Flop,  RST (207-780007) 
c. De ta i l  P a r t  Drawing, Semiconductor, Diode, General  Purpose, Power, 
S i l i c o n  (20 7-780004) 
d. General S p e c i f i c a t i o n ,  VOYAGER F l i g h t  Capsule,  Capac i tors ,  Fixed 
(207-780005) 
e. D e t a i l  P a r t  Drawing, Capaci tor ,  Fixed,  Ceramic (207-780009) 
The Semiconductor General  Spec i f i ca t ion  and the  I n t e g r a t e d  C i r c u i t  Detail  Pa r t  
Drawing are included i n  Appendix (A) as examples. 
The procedure e s t a b l i s h e d  f o r  the i s suance  of a d d i t i o n a l  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  i s  
given i n  t h e  component p a r t ,  material and p rocesses  program p lan ,  P a r t  C ,  
Sec t ion  10 of Volume V I .  
5 .3  APPLICATION MANUAL - P a r t  parameter c o n t r o l  a lone  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
a s s u r e  s a t i s f a c t o r y  opera t ion  of t h e  p a r t .  
Capsule System p l a c e s  equa l  emphasis on use of t he  b e s t  p a r t  and b e s t  u s e  of t h e  
p a r t .  In  conjunct ion  wi th  t h e  Approved P a r t s  L i s t ,  a Pa r t s  Appl ica t ion  Manual 




w a s  i n i t i a t e d  i n  Phase B as a guide f o r  t h e  design groups,  and is d i scussed  i n  
more d e t a i l  i n  P a r t  C,  Sec t ion  10 of Volume V I .  
a minimum i s  inc luded  i n  t h e  manual: 
The fo l lowing  in fo rma t ion  as 
a. Funct ion of t h e  p a r t  
b. App l i ca t ion  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  and l i m i t a t i o n s  
c. Electr ical  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
d. Environmental l i m i t a t i o n s  
e. F a i l u r e  modes 
f .  F a i l u r e  rates 
g. P h y s i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  
h.  Packaging, mounting and handling l i m i t a t i o n s  
5.3.1 
c o n s e r v a t i v e  d e r a t i n g  of e l e c t r i c a l  stress f o r  component p a r t s  is necessary.  
lnese d e r a t i n g  f a c t o r s  w e r e  e s t a b l i s h e d  and inciuded i n  the  i n i t i a l  i s s u e  of 
ou r  a p p l i c a t i o n s  manual. The following are examples of d e r a t i n g  f a c t o r s  used: 
a. I n t e g r a t e d  C i r c u i t s  - Fan-in and fan-out s h a l l  be such t h a t  t h e  power 
Electr ical  Considerat ions - I n  o r d e r  t o  a s s u r e  high r e l i a b i l i t y  des igns ,  
d 
d i s s i p a t i o n  S h a l l  n o t  exceed 50 pe rcen t  of maximum r a t h g .  
b. Power T r a n s i s t o r s  - Power d i s s i p a t i o n  s h a l l  n o t  exceed 30 pe rcen t  of  
r a t e d  maximum, base and emitter c u r r e n t s  s h a l l  n o t  exceed 75 pe rcen t  
of r a t e d  m a x i m u m ,  and vol tages  s h a l l  no t  exceed 75 pe rcen t  of r a t e d  
maximum. 
c. Wire Wound R e s i s t o r s  (1 percent  t o l e r a n c e  and up) - Power d i s s i p a t i o n  
s h a l l  n o t  exceed 50 pe rcen t  of r a t e d  maximum. 
These d e r a t i n g  va lues  are generic ,  and f u r t h e r  e v a l u a t i o n  i s  requ i r ed  f o r  
each i n d i v i d u a l  p a r t  w i t h i n  t h e  general  p a r t  category.  
5.3.2 Mechanical Considerat ions - Consis tent  with t h e  l e v e l  of d e t a i l  design 
e x i s t i n g  i n  t h e  Phase B s tudy ,  a review of the packaging, mounting, and environ- 
mental  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  p a r t s  was performed and comparisons made w i t h  t h e  
p a r t  l i m i t a t i o n s .  The fol lowing items were considered i n  t h e  review: 
a. Thermal i n e r t i a  
b. Thermal conduc t iv i ty  
c. Thermal r a d i a t i o n  on adjacent  p a r t s  
d. V ib ra t ion  
e. Encapsulat ion 
f .  Mounting 
g . In t e rconnec t ion  
5-3 
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This type  o f  review m u s t  cont inue i n  depth as t h e  des ign  proceeds i n t o  
Phase C and D. 
The r e s u l t s  of t h e  review and r e s u l t s  of mechanical and p rocess  tes ts  
provided t h e  d a t a  f o r  p rope r  p a r t s  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  and w a s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  Approved 
Yaterials and Processes  L i s t  and i n  t h e  P a r t s  App l i ca t ion  Manual. 
5.4 TESTING - Tests were conducted p r i o r  t o  and du r ing  Phase B t o  e v a l u a t e  t h e  
e f f e c t s  of h e a t  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  and decontamination cyc le s  and shock. 
i nvo lv ing  t h i r t e e n  p a r t  t y p e s ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  very few f a i l u r e s .  
These tests, 
a. Power diodes f a i l e d  due t o  d e s s i c a n t  l i b e r a t i n g  moi s tu re  du r ing  t h e  
h e a t  cycle .  
e x h i b i t e d  h igh  reverse c u r r e n t  leakage,  none of t h e  f a i l u r e s  r e s u l t e d  
d i r e c t l y  from t h e  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  or shock environment. 
Although a large percentage of one diode type group 
b. Powdered i r o n  core induc to r s  f a i l e d  when s u b j e c t e d  t o  shock beyond 
t h a t  expected i n  t h e  F l i g h t  Capsule. 
T..- -..-A_- .e--- -. -- l v l  ~i auuullaly d L L u ~ a L - u  of t he  above p a r t  t ~ s t l i i ~ g  see P a r t  E, Section 1.1 ui 
Volume V I .  
S e v e r a l  i n s u l a t i o n  and encapsu la t ion  materials are p r e s e n t l y  being eva lua ted  
i n  ou r  l a b o r a t o r i e s  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  temperature ,  o p e r a t i n g  temperature and a t  a 
p r e s s u r e  of Torr t o  a s s u r e  t h a t  ou tgass ing  and sub l ima t ion  w i l l  n o t  c r e a t e  
haza rds  t o  t h e  p a r t  or surrounding parts.  
5 .4 .1  
t e s t i n g  t o  a s s u r e  t h a t  a l l  p a r t s  a r e  s u i t a b l e  f o r  t h e  VOYAGER F l i g h t  Capsu le  
requirements.  Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  t e s t i n g  must be performed and w i l l  i nc lude  d l  
environments deemed necessa ry  t o  q u a l i f y  t h e  p a r t s .  The p a r t i c u l a r  number of 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  samples w i l l  be s e l e c t e d  i n  accordance wi th  i n d i v i d u a l  parameters, 
environments and f a i l u r e  rate requirements.  Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  environment w i l l  
i n c l u d e  h e a t  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  temperatures,  decontamination (ETO) atmospheres, shock, 
humidi ty ,  v i b r a t i o n ,  a c c e l e r a t i o n  and o t h e r s  necessa ry  t o  a s s u r e  compliance with 
VOYAGER requirements.  
v a r i a b l e s  d a t a .  The r e q u i r e d  t e s t i n g  is  r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  p a r t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .  
Q u a l i f i c a t i o n  - During Phase B ,  w e  have examined t h e  r e q u i r e d  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
P a r t  parameter l i m i t s  c o n s i s t  of a t t r i b u t e  as w e l l  a s  
The amount and degree of t e s t i n g  r e q u i r e d  is tempered by information acqu i red  
du r ing  previous programs or received from coopera t ing  agenc ie s ,  such as t h e  
I n t e r s e r v i c e  Data Exchange Program (IDEP) and P a r t s  R e l i a b i l i t y  Information Center /  
Appollo P a r t s  Information Center (PRINCE/APIC). 
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processes  and i n s p e c t i o n  p o i n t s  are i d e n t i f i e d  by t h e  a p p l i c a b l e  internal s p e c i f i -  
c a t i o n  i n c l u d i n g  r e v i s i o n  d a t e .  Subsequent t o  acceptance of t h e  flow c h a r t ,  
changes must be r epor t ed  by t h e  s u p p l i e r  b e f o r e  shipment of p a r t s  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  
p rocess  changes. 
changes i n  t h e  manufacturer ' s  processes ,  i t  e s t a b l i s h e s  a b a s e l i n e  upon which an 
e v a l u a t i o n  can be made of p rocess  changes as they occur  on p a r t s  procured a f t e r  
t h e  i n i t i a l  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  of t h e  manufacturer.  
where p r a c t i c a b l e  by t h e  subcon t rac to r s .  
are purchased a t  one t i m e  and are from t h e  same l o t  as t h e  q u a l i f i c a t i o n  sample.) 
5.5.2 Subcontractor  - Subcontractors  are s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  same c o n t r o l s  as those  
used i n t e r n a l l y  a t  the  prime con t r ac to r .  The s u b c o n t r a c t o r s  are monitored t o  
e n s u r e  conformance. P a r t  s e l e c t i o n  by t h e  s u b c o n t r a c t o r  is l i m i t e d  t o  those  p a r t s  
i nc luded  i n  t h e  VOYAGER Approved P a r t s  L i s t  e s t a b l i s h e d  and maintained by t h e  
n + i m a  L A Y C  c o n t r a c t o r .  
f o r  r e v i s i n g  t h e  Approved F a n s  L i s t  is  d i scussed  i n  P a r t  e ,  Sec t ion  io of 
Volume V I .  
Although t h i s  r equ i r enen t  is not expected t o  p reven t  
S i n g l e  l o t  procurement i s  used 
( A l l  p a r t s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  t h e  system 
In nrdo_r to ucp_ parts n o t  QE the q ~ r n x ? e d  list, a prnccdure 
Subcon t rac to r s  are requ i r ed  t o  keep McDonnell app r i sed  of a l l  p a r t  a p p l i c a t i o n  
and s e l e c t i o n  ac t iv i t ies .  T h i s  information,  coupled wi th  t h e  prime c o n t r a c t o r ' s  
own p a r t  experience,  is  disseminated t o  a l l  s u b c o n t r a c t o r s  t o  minimize p a r a l l e l  
e f f o r t  and encourage c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of p a r t s  a l r e a d y  proven by test .  
5.5.3 T r a c e a b i l i t y  - T r a c e a b i l i t y  requirements provide f o r  t h e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  
of a p a r t i c u l a r  p i e c e  p a r t  o r  group of p a r t s  through a l l  phases of assembly and 
t e s t i n g .  A l l  p a r t s  w i l l  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  e i t h e r  a se r ia l  number o r  l o t  number. 
S e r i a l  n u m b e r s w i l l b e  used on c r i t i c a l  p a r t s  only and w i l l  be  minimized t o  t h e  
g r e a t e s t  e x t e n t  p o s s i b l e .  The t r a c e a b i l i t y  document (207-780002) prepared 
du r ing  ou r  Phase B a c t i v i t y ,  l i s ts  t h e  fo l lowing  p a r t s  as r e q u i r i n g  s e r i a l i z a t i o n .  
T r a n s i s t o r s  - power, f i e l d  e f f e c t  and RF 
Diodes - microwave, v a r a c t o r ,  c o n t r o l l e d  r e c t i f i e r s  
I n t e g r a t e d  c i r c u i t s  
Tubes 
C r y s t a l s  
A l l  o t h e r  p a r t s  w i l l  be i d e n t i f i e d  by l o t  number f o r  t r a c e a b i l i t y .  
Any f a i l u r e s  or d e f i c i e n c i e s  are i s o l a t e d  t o  t h e  p a r t  l e v e l  and proper  correc-  
t i v e  a c t i o n  taken. A l l  f a i l e d  p a r t s  are s u b j e c t e d  t o  f a i l u r e  a n a l y s i s  t o  determine 
f a i l u r e  modes. A f t e r  f a i l u r e  modes are i d e n t i f i e d ,  an a n a l y s i s  of t h e  t es t  d a t a  
w i l l  enab le  determinat ion of t h e  proper c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n .  
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..l This speclficatlon eeIXtbll8hee the goaaral requirsmsnts for ~ a m i ~ ~ a d ~ ~ t o r ,  
trrPsid,ors, diodes aad Intogratad circuits Witable for urn in Vmmr 
p3ipht Q D ~  appllcation. Spci i lc  requlremmte for p8rtlcular d- 
conductor dsrice are lletod in applicable dotall part drawings. 
!* 
!*I BE following doczlabnts, of tho Isare in offed on the date of imitation 
for bide, focr a part of this apeciiicatlon to the d e n t  epeciiied berein: 
5mIFIcATIoIIs 
ltLllkn 
-19500 Solaiconductor M c e s ,  General Speciiication 
-5201 Gold Plat- (glectrodepositod) 
lopc -3 Inspection pirOri~ioa4 for Suppliers of 
Spce I ~ ~ o x - ~ A ~ E ,  P e a ,  Caponento snd Service 
l4sQamu 
207-7800u V i m a l  hpectlon &it@ria, Voyager Flight 
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~ 6 . 1  
1.7 
1.7.1 
1 . 7.1.1 
1.7.1.2 
JLOadaadT Toot. E.ch mmlconductor shall be capable of With- 
standing the pull test, bend test, t w i s t  test, torque test and mlderlng 
heat test M specified in the d e t a i l  P.rt drawing Without physical damage 
t o  the leads, terminals or the semiconductor body, md Without degradation 
of the sendconductor electrical  characteristics. 
ELectrlc4 . 
be aa specified in the d o t a l 1  part drawln#. Semiconductors M s h e d  to 
the 
ssrdconductor electrical performme characteristics shall 
of t h i s  opeciiicotlon sh.ll have mt tho qualiflcatlon 
.nd 8 C C O P h l C e  h 8 p O c t ~ O M  E p O C u i c r d  in 4.2 ud 4.3. 
Sterllis8tlon urd Doc 0- . Sepdcond~ctaw sball operate Within the 
U t s  as specifiod in tb data5.l part dr8- after bow mnb~ected to  
heat storll lsation ud rthqlem oxide decontadmtlon. 
w-8 the d point t.St Ut.  of goug B 
subgroup 2 before aaxl attor the etwlene &de decontamination test. 
This to& shdl conslat of r k  ( 6 )  eepar8te cycles 8t 8 tmqmr8tun of 
.nd Utw10m oxide 8t 56 
relative humldlty and a concentration of 600 m.g./llter of p s s  atroo- 
phere. 
,+ 5*C and an envirorment O f  88$ 
A toot cycle shall conolst of: 
.mWIIIIcIyIRs TRANSISTORS DIO- 
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( Continued ) 
c. 27.5 hours during which the atmosphere is maintained at 50% R.H. with 
a concentration of 600 m.g./liter of 88/12 mixture of Freon 12 and 
ethylene oxide. 
d. 15 ain Utes - evacuate to 70 torr. and permit temperature t o  fall. 
e. 45 mln utes - permlt teaperaturo t o  fa l l  t o  20-25OC W introducing 
ambient air. 
Hiah Tenamrature Stom~e. 
speclfied in the dota l l  part drawing after being tested in accordance with 
Mhod 1031.1 O f  mCSTIL750. Tb. u b i O &  teEper~t.uro for thi8 t0.t 8bI.l 
be 200°C minhull. 
Semiconductors shall operato within the U t 8  
-ratwe CycMeg . % m i C O n d U C h r 8  Shal l  O p e a t e  within the W t S  88 
8peclfied in the de ta i l  part drawing after being tested in accordance v i t h  
lbthod 1051.1 of MILSTIL750 (Test Condition C, lbthod 107 of )IIGsTD202) 
XoiSture R e s l s t ~ .  
specified in the detail  part drawlng after being tested i n  accordance with 
Wstnod iO21.i of iiIL-SE-7jij 
and the Mtlal U, hour soak period.) 
Hermbtic Sea&. 
1 x le8 a t m  - cc per second when tested in accordance with 4.3.3.4. 
Shock. 
specified in the detai l  parts drawlng after being tested In  accordance w i t h  
Wbthod 2016.1 of MGSTD-750, 
each of three mutually perpendicular planes (10 inp.cts each plane). 
Vibration. 
speclfled in the d e t a i l  part drawing when subjected t o  tho Vibration Tost 
b t h o d  2046 of MIL-STD750. 
Semiconductors shall operate wlthin the W t s  a8 
i6, tG.i,-Sb%z, omitting %ep TB 
Semlconductor shall not exhibit leak rat08 in excess of 
Semiconductors shall be capable of operation within the l l d t s  as 
A t o t a l  of 30 inpect8 shall b8 applied in 
Semiconductors shall be capable of operation wlthln the M t s  
&u Tenmeratwe b rat- sepliconductors shall be capable of operating 
AcceleratiQa, Semiconductors shall be capable of operation within l ldts  
a8 specified in the de ta i l  put drawing after rrubjected t o  a con8tant 
acceleration of 20,OOOg's per Method 2006 of mCSTIL750, with the semi- 
conductors M) oriented that the acceleration rector is in the d inc t ion  (aorpaw in T1 orientation only) most me* t o  produce pbchnicil/ 
bonded interconnection failure. 
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Iat I-&* . a c h  sendconductor not requlrlng jtart eerlallsation 
6hall contain the nunufacturer's lot  identlfication mdwr which shall 
identify the oendconductor with the appllcable recorded data fo r  A mi- 
cular group or lot of parte included under tho idlsntirring lot mmber. 
A mnufacturer's l o t  is doflmd au a quantity of porte produced in o m  mob 
ar less, f ram a 
for tests at tbe same t i r s . A  WcDOnaeU V o y a g e r  plight Capule lot shall be 
the -up of parts t o  be mb~acted t o  the acceptance i.mpectlon qmclfiod 
in 4.3. The lot of parts purchaeed t o  this epeclfication shall be h A 
slngla mnufacturer's lat except uhere daiat iona have beon subrdtted ud -. 
Ibcmntati on and lhta t-. The retiables data ~et,t .d d e r  (a) .nd 
?b) below shall be subpitted with the esrdconductor. In the addition to tl 
psrumter values, the punched card shall contain tho ixdlridual dcowiuc- 
tor lot mrber or ssrial  ,llcDormbll part mmber, date, otc. hta 
recorded regarding a rejected XcIkmrsll lot 6- be foruarded to the 
HcIbmmll Caapruv. A cow of all required data ohal l  b8 kept OLI file 
tho mmufacturer for a period of at least five years ironr the date of 
b a 3 v o q  of Ym coqonmts. 
4.3.4 the eonqment ' ~ s c t i c ~  r + p %  %r;; p r  Pigtie 1 s k i  k eap ie tad  
aad mbaftted d t h  each shipat of parts and data cards. hta mbdttal 
production line tw- the 8- design, aaterlalr, 
plunriecturine processss and speciiicatione, and presented t o  iB8pection 
A t  the C o q l s t i o n  of tbe test Sp6clfbd in 
shall include the follawing: 
(a) Variables data on each of tho Critical -torr opecified at the 
loo% lael for each aealconductor given the acceptance inspection per 
4.3. 
(b) Variables data on a l l  parartors 8peclfied in the apjMc8bl.e dotall  
part drawing taken during final electrical 1lbaeurement6 (post tmrn- 
in) final electrical impaction (Group A inspbcticn). 
(c) D.ta on all parameters speclfied in the appllcable dotall  part dmulq 
followiag the Qpup B environwmt test per 4.3.7. 
hamr4. 
herein shall be in accordance with the appllcable requlmmmts of WC 200-3 
The examination and testing of cmmiconductor devices shall be classified aa 
follows: 
(a) Qalvicat ion hepodion 
(b) Acceptance bqmction 
4 l e m n t a t i o n  of the qp.llty assurance provisions speclfied 
I I 
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spetciiication. bts which are rejectable via e a a ~ ~ l i n g  bmpecticm be 
mweoxnd 100 porcent for the failing characteristics and my then be 
re.ubdtt6d o m  t i r  t o  inspection. In addition, HcnprmSll r e ~ m 8  the 
ri&t to isample test each 100 percent inepection nqulmmnt for oach lot t 
a 2 percemt LTPD level pad reject paor lot tht does not & the 
a. 
4.3.3 PIY aot mqalred to k repeated when t h q  are d r e a d y  included in the 
ranuiactmera LlocIlal production processiag. 
-m mctiqg, 
madconductors at an LTPD of 15 percent aa specified (Rsf. Table I for 
VImaal  xa8Da ctiop. V i s u a l  Inspection shall be performed at a 100 percent 
-1 aa epecifbd in t he  de ta i l  part drawlng and speclfimtion 207-7fWll 
a8 applicable. Semlconductore not meting the vimal iaepectloa criteria 
sb.ll be rejected. Integrated circuits shall be mlcro-photopaphod in 
esler, per k.?.?. 
T b  100 percent proce8*precoaditioning BIld a c z w e ~  tests in 
Dlrsaeioarl inspectior ahall k p e r f d  on tba 
dnirpr -8). 
a*~cQg&t h * a n d s c r e ~  . The rJemicollYdUCtom in the lot 
The test ppbthods m@.oyed shall shall be subjected to  the following tests. 
k in accordance with WIGSTD-750. The emdronmntal tests shall be perc 
i d  prior to  the burpin inupaction of 4.3.3.7. Test  4.3.3.1 t h ru  
4.3.5 ahall be perfoxmd in the following sequence. 
I& T-a t w o  stcq&& The mimiconductors shall be eubjected to  a high 
taqerature .torage per neSTD.750, Method 1031.1 at a temperature o t  
2oooc 85aImm 
T w r a t u r e  Cv cuqg. Tbu mmdconductora ia the lot sball be tarperatwe 
-led in accordance with MtSTIb750, Method 1051.1 (WIGSTD.202, Whod 
U7B, Test  condition C). 
c o q  Acceloratioq. Tha semiconductor shall be subjected to con8tant 
acceleration in accordance with ~ S T I b 7 5 0 ,  bthod 2006. A mpMarrrn aentri 
rugal acceleration of 20,000g's shall k, applied, with the Wpiconductor 80 
oriented that the acceleration vector i s  in the Yl a1d8 direction (or that 
axis a c h  all lpost Uelyproduce mschadcal bonded lnterconasction 
faxlure). 
I I LU I -  i O'JL',. ST. LOUIS, YO. 1 
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1IIL-8TD-20@ , Method U.2, Test CoDditian A. 
e s m n t  h.a within the .ariconductor c u e  ahall be cawe for device 
rejection. 
pinc Leak. Each semiconductor and -tal ccued diode ahall be teated in 
accordonce w i t h  WIL-STD-202, mtbad ll2, hs t  Condition C, Pr 
per aecond ahal l  be rejectad. 
Q u a  Diode Seal met. 
w a d i c  pmS8UX-e oi UK) pB%g in a dution or i q m p y i  a l ~  v i a  
oolotlng dye for two burr. nDunving preaaurization, riruhg, aad 
drying, each diode 8haU receive a rever8e current t e m t  .od UI 
operating vibration t e a t  (MO 4.3.3.5). %be time interval between 
preaaurioation t e a t  coqletiom and a t a r t  of the electrical  teato 8hd.l 
be at 1e-t tu0 burr, but rrcrt t o  exceed eiebt houra. Diode. exhibiting 
reveree leakage in exceaa of the l i r i t a  qmcified in tha detail part 
dravlng, ionic contamination (Micated by mobile hptereaia promming  
in the high current diredim! nr tQe p ~ t ~ & i =  shall h r ~ i r m - ~  
Operating - Vlbratloa Test. Uhere specified, each aaricoabuctor .hill be 
subjected to a s i q l e  hamon ic vibration having a rinlmxm of 0.1 inch 
double ..plitude di8placewnt at a frqwncy of 60 + 2 cp. for a rioian 
period of 30 aeccmd.. Lharing vibration c o n t i n u o u ~ ~  monitor the reverae 
c b a r a k c t e r i ~ t i C ,  wept at 60 cpa, to t h e  brae current or voltage speci- 
fied. Devices d l q p ~ l n g  f lut ter ,  drift, dynamic lmtabi l i t i ea  or ahift 
ln trace shall be reJected. 
Each aemlconductor .bdu be teated in accordance vith 
kry indication of .it 
Each g l u m  ccued diode .hall be aubject to an 
Pro-Burn-In Electrical ntuurrranta. Each aemlconductor in the V o y a g e r  
ni@t Capmule lot  &al l  be rubjected to electrical  meaouremnta of t&e 
critical p a r u t e r a  (LOO$ -1) specified in the applicable detail  
part draving. All variable data ohal l  be recorded. 
--In Operational Life Tart. 
to a burn-in (operational l i te  t a r t )  at tho electrical  level .ad taqnra. 
tw for 168 hours M opecified in the detail part drawing. 
Port Burn-In Electrical Meuurementa. 
r c u u r a e n t a  except that l i m i t .  including delta or parameter incremental 
-8 ahall be u rpecified ln the deta i l  part draving. 
d.ch remiconductor ahall  be rubjected 
Sam 61) pre-burn electrical  
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Orow A Electrlml Itmpo ctioa. Group A electrical  inspection ahall be 
R - f o d  b;v lot a w e  u mpecifiod in the -up A inspection, Table 
I1 of tho applicable detail put draving. me rinipu a m l a  a i m  to 
U~UIY a I,& 'folennce percent Defective (L'IPD) qwcifiod w i t h  
confidence for vuioum taure acceptance nmberm (a) i o  hcnn in  
w e  I of t b i m  opecificatioa. =e rejection n m b r  (r), qualm a + 1. 
'Ih. acceptace 
be selected fra  Table I of fhia apecificatlon by the muuafacturer. 
m V1.W Inrp. ctlon. Lrlrvl v laur l  rsr#ction .biu be perfond at 
~ p e r c e n t l e v e ~  C& tbow aalcatductnra uhich meet the r i a &  
irup.ctiosr C r i - i r  .p.cifl.d rbll be .hipped. 
X - r 4  rt*larrutloa. UrS.ar afb.rviae 6pecified in the detail put apecl- - btar .ab diode not peaalttu intaroil viruJ 
hmpection ahall  be pbofop.phrd um- .D X - r q  mchlne of auiticient 
powr to .hau the lntenml cautructioa. 
r i c m  photographod par 4.3.7. sufficient definition i a  achieved when 
free puf ic l ea  of molder or other f o r e m  ratter one 8 I . l  in diameter cna 
be detexalned. A aerier of x-ray photographs ahall be taken prped lcu -  
iu to the longitudinal aria (in two rut- perpandicuhr p-8). 
S e  r-ry ghotograpba akaU k i&niii ie& Aw a e m u r e  %rmceabiiiicy it0 the 
M i v l d u l  remlconductor vhen p u t  serialiaatioa l a  required. 
cr i te r ia  .h.l be in a c c o ~ c e  vith XcD0nnel.l 2~?7-780011. 
PhotoCp..phic Record.. lkch integr.ted clrcuit  .h.l be photogr8phed at 
3.00~ rgni f ic r t ion ,  in color, jut prior to ftnal mal. photographs 
8hall be ibnt1ti.d vi th  &vice p u t  n d r  and aerial n a r  aul deliv- 
ered vith the devicea. phatomqbm .h.L1 &w aufficlent reaolutiar to 
.hou acratchea la tb couiuctor patha, particle i n c l ~ r l ~ ~ ,  otc. 
m i u  nqulred to uaure  tbe mpecifiod LTPD 
Integrated clrcuitr  ahell be 
Accept~ca 
ction. Semiconductor parla from the lot 
be shipped par thla mpociflcation ahall be #-le teated u .p.cifled 
in the III (?roup B Impectiar of the applicable detail gut 
&awln#. 
lI.e., h w n  error, ~ t m m m t a t i o n ,  p u m e t r i c O  or  cataatrapbic) ahall 
be aubdtted to McDomeU am all accountable and unaccountable fnllurea 
hllt~8 Accortnf.bllity. A U ? C O m t i n g  Of f.llux'8a aul 
Occurring dWiW r~cMpt.n~8 I ~ C t i O a .  
PRgPARATIoII n1R DBLLVWI 
unit p.clue . 'pbe wmlcomiuctora sha3.l bo lmlividu8U.y packaged to 
k 
c l e u 4  -ked u to  aemlcoductor type., aerial  amber urd l o t  nurkr .  
P- de.* ahall be rubjoct to &Damell approval prior to  wage by 
tl18 nmfacturer. 
ct *%e a 18.85 during a i p n t .  E a  wit plcL.g. 
I 1 
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P.ct.gine of Shipping Containers. The unit packages #hall k packed 
in the rhipping containerr in a mmaer to pmvidc vrLnr protection 
iror .hock and vibration during truuitj and in the order of amwading 
rerial number or groups of rerial numbersD to facilitate ud miniriu 
handling subrequsnt to dellvary. 
Elrrlting of Shipping Containers. Each shipping container &all  be mrked 
vith the mnuiacturer's 1~.b, p u t  de8i(pution n&rD data code a d  lot 
nudnt . 
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I I 
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I I 
I Final visual 1 
Serial !?ua&rs of ReJectd Parts 
U t y  Assurance Manager 
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VENDOR SYMBOL ADJACENT 
TO PIN I 
.050-'.005 
(NOTE 2) 




( 4  
( 5  
-006 MAX 
-004 MIN L 
-065 MAX! 






Lead spacing dimensions apply in this area only. 
Tolemnces am noncumulat iw . 
Pin numbeo for reference only and do not appear on part. 
IAWN 
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Positive logic Definitions: High Voltage = 1 
low Voltage - 0 
Both Q and 
eitherS orR rises 
Clocked set-reset Q is  the logic state after 
the first negative going edge of the clock pulse 
at pin 10 with initial conditions before clock 
pulse at S and R as shown. C C 
in 1 state  until 
D D  
Table I, Maximum Ratinas (u OC) 
Chamcterist ic 
Input Voltage (Pins 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10) 
Output Voltage (Pins 3, 8) 
Vcc (Pin 6) 
Vbb (Pin 5) 
input Current (Pins 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10) 










-1 00 - 55 
-65 
Max. 
+ 8  
+ 8  
+8.2 
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1 .  General 
1.1 These parts s h a l l  be specified, procured and used under the McDannell 
approved part number 207-780007 (any vendor part number is  for reference 
only). 
These por ts  s h a l l  meet all nquiremenh of McDonnell drawing 207-78003 
except as noted herein. 
1.3 Al l  tests and measursments s h a l l  be performed at a temperature of 25 Q C 
unless otherwise specified. 
All symbols and abbreviations shall be as defined in MIL-S-19500. 
All voltage and capacitance measurements are referenced to ground unless 
noted. Rx2k-a currmt fiew Is defffj~ld k?o ?w pin referenced. Pins 







2.1.1 Performance characteristics shall be as specified in Table II 
(Group A) and Table IV (Group B) inspections. 
2.1.2 The maximum electrical ratings h l l  be as specified in fable 
when opemted at an ambient temperature of 25 C. 
0 
2.2 Mechanical 
2.2.1 Each device shall ba of the design, construction and physical dimen- 
sions specified herein. 
2.2.2 leads sha l l  be in accordance with MIL-STD-1276, Type K. 
2.2.3 Devices shall be monolythic, planar passivated construction. 
2.3 Environmental 
J 
APPRD FLIPFLOP, RST 1 I I 
MCDONNBLL 
DRAWING NO. WEE’ 
207-780007 5 APPRD 
ST. LOUIS, YO. 
2.3.1 Duvices shal l  n e e t  the end point test limits of Group B, Subgroup 2 
before and after tho sterilization heat test (6 cycles) per pamgmph 
3.7.1.1 of 207-780003. 
1 I INTEGRATED CIRCUIT RAWN APPRD 
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2.3 Environmental (Continued) 
2.3.2 Devices shall meet the end point test l i m i t s  of Group B, Subgroup 2 
before and after the ethylene oxide decontamination test (6 cycles) 
per paragraph 3.7.1.2 of 207-780003. 
2.4 Failure Rate 
2.4.1 The qualification approval devices shall demonstrate a maximum 
failure rate of 1 .O percent per 1 ,OOO hours at 90 percent confidence 
level. Failures are defined as devices which do not meet the Table 111 
(Group A) inspection requirements. During the l i fe test, the devices 
shall be operated at T 425 e°C,  dynamic operation at lOOKH in 
the circuit described in test circuit Figure 3. 
A z 
2.5 .%rkir?g 
2.s.i Each device shaii be pennanentiy and iegibiy marked per McDonneii 
specification 207-780003, paragraph 3.10 with the following: 
- Manufacturer's name or symbol 
- Serial number in accordance with McDonnell specification 
207-780003, paragraph 3.1 1 
- McDonnell part number. 
2.6 Quality Assurance 
2.6.1 Qualification inspection shall consist of the examinations and tests 
specified in Tables II, 111 and IV in addition to the failure rate 
inspection of paragraph 2.4. 
2.6.2 Acceptance inspection shall consist of the examinations and tests 
of Table I1 100 percent process pmconditioning and screening and 
Table 111 (Group A) inspections. 
APPENDIX A 










2.6 Quality Arsumnce (Continued) 
2.6.3 Each device shall be photographed at lOOX magnification, in color, 
just prior to final seal. Photographs shall be identified with device 
part number and serial number and delivered with the devices. 
Photographs shall have sufficient resolution to show scratches in 
conductor path, particle inclusions, etc. 
2.7 Preparation for Delivery 
2.7.1 Devices shall be ppared for delivery in accordance with McDonmll 
specification 207-780003, pamgmph 5. 
1 I 
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INTEGRATED CIRCUIT APPRD 
IECK APPRO FLIP FLOP, RST 
I 
YODEL VOL ASSY 
NO. 
I DRAWING NO. 207-780007 MCDONNELL 'PRD APPRD ST. LOUIS, YO. 
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REV MODEL V 
APPRD INTEGRATED CIRCUCT 
APPRD FLIP FLOP, RST I 
I DRAWING NO. WEE1 APPRD MCDONNBfLL 207-780007. 9 ST. LOUIS, MO. 
CODE IDENT NO. 76301 ( R E V  4 4UG 6 1 )  
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Input Pulse A: 
ov 
REV MODEL 
RAWN APPRD INTEGRATED CIRCUIT 
Input Pulse 8: 
VOL ASS1 
NO. 
L 2us*10% 4 
HECK APPRD 
PPRD APPRD I 
CLOCKED MODE SWITCHING LEVEL 
FLIP FLOP, RST 
DRAWING NO. SHEE' 
207-780007 12 MCDONNPLL 








Set Vg=l .O Vdc; V+.O Vdc; momentary contact, V7 to ground. 
Apply one input pulse to Pin 10. 
The device shall be rejected if it does not change state when the single input pulse i s  
applied . 
kt V+.O Vdc; V r 1  .O Vdc; momentary contact, V4 to ground. 
Apply one input pulse to Pin 10. 
The device shall be mjechd i f  it &os not change state when the single input pulse is  
appl led. 
CLOCKED MODE HOLDING LEVEL 
a) Apply input pulses. 
b) Set V2=3.4V, Vpt.OV. 
C) 
d) 
e) Set V+.OV, v ~ 3 . N .  
9 
a) 
h n t a r y  contact, Pin 4 to Pin 1, vg shal l  be high ( 
The part shall be reiected if V8 does not mmain high when Pin 4 i s  open. 
h n t a r y  contact, Pin 7 to Pin 1, V8 shall be low ( 














t- Off -7- 
FLIP FLOP, RST I I I 
DRAWIMGMO. WEE 
207-780007 13 MCDONNI'LL 
ST. LOUIS, YO. 
Note: 
CL includes itg and probe capacitunce 
SWITCHING TIME TEST CIRCUIT 
FIGURE 2 
I I INTEGRATED CIRCUIT APPRD 
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DYNAMIC OPERATING CIRCUIT -2VDC 
(POWER BURN IN AND OPERATING LIFE)  
FIGURE 3 
REV MODEL VOL ASSY 
INTEGRATED CIRCUIT NO. ? A W N  APPRD 
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REV MODEL VOL ASS1 
APPRD INTEGRATED CIRCUIT NO. 
APPRO FLIP FLOP, RST 
I 
DRAWING NO. SHE€ 
207-780007 15 mcDouuILL APPRD 
ST. LOUIS, YO. I 
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MCDONNELL ASTRONAUTICS 
Parts shall be procured directly from the manufacturers listed under the following approved 
sources of supply: 
Signetiu Corporotion 08324) 
Sunnyvale, Glifomia 
pbrt No. SEl24G 
The above listed vendors and designations are the only items and sources for par ts  specified 
herein approved for procurement a d o r  use on McDonneII products. Vendon of competitive 
articles may apply to the McDonnell Standards Engineering Department for approval as a 
source of supply. 
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